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Martin: Criminal Law - Confessions - Wyoming Standards Governing the Admi

CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSIONS-Wyoming Standards Governing the Admissibility of Confessions Obtained During the Period of Custodial Interrogation. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 (Wyo. 1975).

At Gerald Dryden's trial for second degree murder, the
State was permitted to introduce damaging statements elicited from him during a six day pre-arraignment detention.
Although Dryden had asked to see an attorney on the evening of his arrest and again in the course of two subsequent
interrogations, the investigating officers waited to honor his
request until after he had agreed to waive his Miranda v.
Arizona" rights and admit his presence at the scene of the
murder. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the denial
of Dryden's motion to suppress, holding that the state may
not question a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel
unless the suspect himself initiates the conversation.2
This note will examine the utility of Wyoming's new
per se' admissibility prerequisite in the light of the inconsistent standards which have characterized judicial determinations of the admissibility of inculpatory statements.
THE

PRE-Miranda VOLUNTARINESS STANDARD

The Supreme Court has long struggled to formulate
comprehensible standards by which to judge the in-court
admissibility of extrajudicial confessions. The controversy
and confusion surrounding high court admissibility rulings
reflect a tension between competing societal values: the need
for police interrogation in the efficient enforcement of the
criminal law, and the fifth amendment assurance that no
individual need incriminate himself "unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."4
Prior to its decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court
dealt with problems of admissibility by assessing the volunCopyright@) 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 493 (Wyo. 1975).
3. The term per se is used to refer to a rule that requires the exclusion of
admissions when a satisfactory objective prerequisite has not been met, as
opposed to a rule whose operation depends upon the issue of subjective
voluntariness. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 544 (White, J.,
dissenting).
4. Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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tariness of the confession. Incriminatory revelations which
were "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice"' could be freely admitted into evidence, while those
elicited from a defendant whose "will [had] been overborne"'
were excluded as offensive to due process.7
This voluntariness determination required the Court to
engage in a case-by-case scrutiny of all of the factors surrounding a challenged confession. It was, in fact, an inquiry
into the effect of police interrogation upon the subjective
state of mind of the defendant, and as such required an
assessment of "both the characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation."'
Few concrete guidelines emerge from an admissibility
test dependent not only upon the interaction of person and
circumstance, but also upon a resolution of the "inevitable
swearing contest"9 between the interrogating officers and
the accused over what took place in the stationhouse. In a
limited number of early cases,'" the Court found the circumstances attending interrogation so "inherently coercive"" as
5. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
6. Id.
7. See Recent Cases, Government Can Satisfy Its Burden of Proving Waiver
of Miranda Rights By Showing Warnings Given, Signed Waiver, and
Proof of Defendant's Capacity to Understand the Warnings, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 1069, 1071 (1973). The note explains that the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona was predicated upon the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Previously, however, the
Court had judged the admissibility of confessions used in state criminal
proceedings in terms of the demands of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause.
8. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). The Court stated
that:
Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth
of the accused, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596; his lack of education, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560; or his low intelligence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191; the lack of any advice
to the accused of his constitutional rights, e.g., Davis v. North
Carolina, 884 U.S. 737; the length of detention, e.g., Chambers v.
Florida [309 U.S. 227]; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143; and the
use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep,
e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433.
9. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.
J., dissenting).
10. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which the court excluded confessions which had been brutally elicited, and Chambers v.
Florida, supra note 8, in which the Court excluded confession obtained
after prolonged and relentless incommunicado interrogation.
11. Comment, Interrogation Efficiency and Protection of the Suspect Through
the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure: A Step Beyond Miranda,
60 IA. L. REV. 395, 396 (1974).
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to establish compulsion as a matter of law. With these few
exceptions, however, it could rarely be said that the decision
to exclude a confession was required by the presence or absence of a clearly definable criterion.12
A move toward the evolution of concrete standards applicable to admissibility determinations in the federal courts
was taken by the Court in McNabb v. United States" and
later reaffirmed in Mallory v. United States. 4 The McNabbMallory rule required the automatic exclusion of evidence secured in violation of the federal statutory requirement' that
an arrested person be taken before a committing magistrate
without "unnecessary delay."'" Because it was predicated
upon the Court's supervisory powers, however, the rule was
never constitutionally mandated upon the states.
It was six years after the Mallory decision that the
Court took the first significant step away from sole reliance
upon the voluntariness test in Escobedo v. Illinios.7 Escobedo
required the exclusion of confession obtained in violation of
the right to counsel at the time of interrogation, and, as a
constitutionally based decision, was clearly applicable to state
criminal proceedings.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF Miranda

The decision in Mirandav. Arizona marked the Court's
most comprehensive attempt to establish standardized postarrest interrogation procedures. Miranda's concern was apparently "not with the [voluntariness] standard [itself] but
12. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra note 8, at 226.
13. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
14. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). McNabb, decided before the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, held inadmissible in a federal prosecution a
confession obtained after an "unnecessary delay" in taking the arrested
person before a committing magistrate. Mallory applied the McNabb rule
to violations of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules.
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
16. This move away from the voluntariness test has been vitiated by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, which makes delay between arrest and arraignment only one of
the factors to be considered in a voluntariness determination. Although
it has been argued that the McNabb and Mallory decisions were constitutionally grounded, the general view is that the return to the "totality of
the circumstances" test explicit in Congress' overruling of Mallory was not
invasive of judicial prerogative. See Ganadara, Admissibility of Confession
in Federal Prosecutions: Implementation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officers and the Courts, 63 GEO. L. J. 305, 307 n.11 (1974).
17. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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with an effective mechanism to apply it." 8 Convinced that
custodial questioning is by its nature coercive, the Court
spoke of the "necessity for procedures which assure that the
individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment . . . not to be compelled to incriminate himself."'"
Viewing "knowledge of one's rights and freedom from coer'2cion [as] conditions precedent to making a free choice, "
Miranda required that the police not question a suspect until
he has been advised that he has the right to remain silent,
that any statement he makes may be used against him, and
that he can insist upon the presence of retained or appointed
counsel during the questioning period.2 An easily applicable
admissibility rule might have outlawed altogether the use
of confessions made in the absence of counsel; the Court was
unwilling, however, to impose so stringent a standard. Stating that "[c]onfessions remain a proper element in law enforcement," the Court made it clear that uncoerced statements volunteered by a suspect after full advisement of his
fifth and sixth amendment rights are freely admissible
against him.2 Before it can offer this evidence, however,
the government must convincingly demonstrate 3 that the
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his rights to silence and counsel.24
Any notion that Miranda had resolved the inconsistencies of the ad hoc voluntariness approach has been dissipated
in the intervening years of lower court decisions. By requiring the government to prove knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver, Miranda "shifted the focus of inquiry from the
voluntariness of the confession to the voluntariness of the
18. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE Appendix XIII, at 720
(Proposed Off. Draft, 1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
19. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 439.
20.

Comment, Interrogation Efficiency and Protection of the Suspect Through
the Model Code of Pro-Arraignment Procedure: A Step Beyond Miranda,

supra note 11, at 399.
21. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 444, 471.
22. Id. at 478.
23. Under the Miranda vernacular, a "heavy burden" rested upon the government to prove knowing and intelligent waiver.

Id. at 475.

That burden

was redefined in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). Although leaving
the states free to adopt higher standards, the Logo Court established that
the minimum standard was proof by at least a preponderance of the
evidence.
24. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 479.
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waiver preceding it." 5 Although further inquiry has been
rendered irrelevant in the absence of the required warnings, once the fact of the warnings has been established,
the circumstances surrounding a challenged waiver remain
to be assessed. As a result, the inconsistency which characterized lower court interpretations of the old voluntariness
standard characterizes as well post-Miranda approaches to
the problem of waiver.
The impact of any leading decision is subject to the inevitable process of interpretation through which the lower
courts can water down what appeared to be its strict requirements. Miranda has been no exception. Although it would
seem that the courts could not countenance deviation from
the absolute requirement that "[i]f the individual states that
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present,""7 appellate interpretations of this standard have been far from uniform. While some courts have
held that police-requested statements taken after invocation
of the right to counsel "must be presumed a product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise,12 the prevailing opinion in the
state courts seems to be that Miranda should not be read as
forbidding the police from urging the suspect to reconsider
waiver. 5 Similar inconsistency has characterized judicial
resolution of the closely related problem of waiver obtained
after invocation of the right to silence. Miranda'spronouncement that "[i]f the individual indicates . .. that he wishes
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease"' has been
strictly enforced in some jurisdictions."' Others, however,
have upheld the government's claim of waiver where a defendant has indicated inculpatory conversation while being questioned,"2 where reconsideration has been urged "in a careful,
25. MODEL CODE § 140.3, Commentary, at 352.
26. "[T]he expedient of giving an adequate warning . . . [is] so simple, we
will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was
aware of his rights without a warning being given." Miranda v. Arizona,
supra note 1, at 468.
27. Id. at 474.
28. United States v. Preist, 409 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1969). See, e.g., United
States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974).
29. MODEL CODE, § 140.8, Commentary, at 372.
30. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 473, 474.
31. United States v. Bensinger, 463 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 932 (1972); United States v .Barnes, 432 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. Holloway v. United States, 495 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974).
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noncoercive manner, '"" and where the police allow a time
lapse before attempting to reopen interrogation and precede
requests for waiver with re-advisement of constitutional
rights."4
The Wyoming Supreme Court could similarly have
adopted a position in conflict with at least the spirit, if not
the letter, of the Mirandamandates. Instead, in a decision"5
which reaffirmed Miranda's requirements, it has demanded
strict adherence to procedures which assure that the suspect
be clearly informed of his constitutional rights and not badgered into waiving his right to counsel.
THE WYOMING SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN

Dryden

The factual situation which gave rise to the Wyoming
decision was as follows: On January 17, 1974, Gerald Dryden was taken into custody in connection with police investigation of a murder. Although he was informed of some of
his Miranda rights, he was not told of his right to have an
attorney present during the questioning period until his
fourth interrogation on January 22. Questioned on the night
of his arrest by authorities aware that he had asked to see
an attorney, Dryden admitted his presence at the murder
scene. He made no further admissions at his second and third
interrogations, on the 18th and 19th, but did repeat his request for counsel. These requests were ignored, however,
even though Dryden was taken before a magistrate on an
unconnected charge on January 19. On January 22, following a proper administration of Miranda warnings, Dryden
expressed willingness to waive his rights to silence and counsel, and again admitted his presence at the scene of the crime.
Criminal complaint and warrant were filed the following
day.
A. Standards Applicable to Testimony that Miranda Rights
Have Been Given.
Since a defendant cannot "knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily" waive rights of which he has no knowledge,
33. United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2nd Cir. 1972).
34. State v. Estrada, 63 Wis.2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359 (1974).
35. Dryden v. State, supra note 2.
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a necessary element of the state's burden of proof on waiver
would appear to be an explicit showing that the defendant
was given the required Miranda warnings." Yet despite his
dissatisfaction 7 with the failure of the interrogating officers to relate the substance of the warnings given, the district judge held testimony no more explicit than that Dryden
had been "advised of his rights" sufficient to satisfy Miranda's mandate. The Wyoming Supreme Court explicitly
condemned this conclusionary testimony, pronouncing it totally insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof prerequisite
to the admissibility of inculpatory statements."8
Because disposition of the case turned not upon the inadequacy of the testimony, but rather upon the failure of
the state to establish waiver, the evidentiary standard sufficient to demonstrate proper Miranda warnings was not delineated. However, since condemnation was confined to the
conclusionary nature of the testimony, it seems clear that
the state will be allowed to prove the adequacy of a Miranda
warning by the uncorroborated oral testimony of an officer
who can recount its precise wording. This is a standard sufficient in most jurisdictions, 9 but because it is one which
leads frequently to admissibility determinations dependent
upon a resolution of the relative credibility of conflicting accounts of what transpired, other alternatives seem desirable.
In some jurisdictions, the officer's testimony is augmented
by the defendant's signature on a written warnings and
waiver form.4" While not necessarily dispositive of a challenge to the voluntariness of waiver, 1 the signed statement
could provide objective substantiation of the adequacy of the
warnings themselves. The Model Code provides for verifica36. As previously noted, sup'a note 26, the state cannot rely on the circumstances to show a defendant's awareness of his fifth and sixth amendment
rights. The Wyoming Supreme Court has demanded strict adherence to
Miranda's demand that the warnings be explicitly related. Dryden v. State,
supra note 2, at 491.
37. Id. at 486 n.3.
38. Id. at 487 n.5.
39. MODEL CODE, § 130.4, Commentary, at 346.
40. MODEL CODE, § 130.4, Commentary, at 347.
[T]he signed waiver prerequisite is not a panacea because it does
41.
not resolve the voluntariness problems that arise in situations
where a written waiver form is signed. Since the police could
coerce a suspect into signing the form, a determination of whe-
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tion of sufficiency of the warnings by requiring that they
be tape-recorded,42 a procedure which has been termed the
"most efficient and effective means at this time of reconstructing the conditions of stationhouse interrogation for the
purpose of determining whether the proper procedural safeguards have been followed."'"
B. Reasoning Underlying the Dryden Decision.
The Wyoming court's decision in the Dryden case turned
upon a determination of the elements necessary "to constitute a valid warning and knowledgeable waiver of rights.""'
The State argued in favor of the admissibility of the
statement made by Dryden on the evening of his arrest by
contending that as a three-time convicted felon, Dryden had
''a great deal of insight into his right to have an attorney
present," 5 and by speaking freely to the sheriff had waived
his right to counsel. Citing Miranda's requirement that
"whatever the background of the person interrogated, a
warning at the time of interrogation is indispensable ... to
insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the
privilege at that point in time," 6 the court "summarily reject[ed]"4 7 the State's attempt to prove Dryden's subjective
knowledge. Because the State had failed to advise the defendant "of his right not only to have an attorney but of his
right to have an attorney present prior to and during the
questioning,""3 the district court was held to have erred in
admitting Dryden's initial statement.
The court's holding in this regard was a clear affirmation of Miranda'smandate that no matter how knowledgeble
the defendant, failure to inform him of constitutional rights
requires exclusion of his subsequent admissions. In view of

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

ther the form was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently signed
would be required.
Comment, InterrogationEfficiency and Protection of the Suspect Through
the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure: A Step Beyond Miranda,
supra note 11, at 409.
MODEL CODE, § 130.4(3) (a).
MODEL CODE, § 130.4, Commentary, at 347.
Dryden v. State, supra note 2, at 491.
Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 469.
Dryden v. State, supra note 2, at 491.
Id.
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the Wyoming court's explicit adoption of this per se standard,
its footnoted statement that the question of waiver cannot
be meaningfully resolved when the State has failed to establish proper warnings" was anamolous. Such resolution is
indeed possible under the old voluntariness standard. The
point of the exclusionary rule adopted in Dryden, however,
is to entirely preclude this determination and to focus solely
upon police behavior.
The State next argued that even if the statement made
by Dryden on the evening of his arrest was inadmissible, the
court should affirm the admission of Dryden's response to
the interrogation conducted on January 22 because it had
been made subsequent to proper warning and explicit waiver.
This argument, stated the court, presented the question whether "having previously failed properly to advise the accused
of his privilege not to testify against himself, and knowing
of the accused's desire for counsel, investigating officers
could continue to examine him and by finally coming up with
a proper warning and an apparently freely made statement,
clear away the debris of the earlier and improper examinations."' ° The court held that they could not. Citing Miranda's edict that "[i]f the individual states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney
is present,"'" the court held that once a defendant has expressed his desire for counsel, he may not be subjected to
further interrogation "unless and until" he himself initiates
the conversation. 2 By so holding, the Wyoming court has announced as a matter of law that admissions are per se involuntary if elicited from a suspect who has invoked his right to
counsel and not himself reopened interrogation.
C. The Significance and Potential Extension of the Dryden
Decision.
Wyoming's per se waiver rule constitutes a useful measure in the standardization -of admissibility prerequisites,
for it has eliminated the necessity for a determination of the
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 489 n.9.
Id. at 492.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 474.
Dryden v. State, supra note 2, at 493.
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voluntariness-in-fact of a police-requested waiver preceded
by the defendant's request for counsel. By citing precedent
from Wyoming case law,"3 and by speaking of Miranda as
"pertinent in the construction that we should give to our own
constitutional provision [against self-incrimination],"" the
Wyoming court has arguably established an exclusionary
standard grounded in the state constitution. The rule, in any
case, goes beyond Miranda,for even under Miranda's "heavy
burden" stricture," the government need not depend upon
suspect-initiated conversation to prove the voluntariness of a
waiver made subsequent to request for counsel.
Miranda has provided the criminal defendant with a
panoply of rights which allow him to invoke or waive silence
or counsel at any time prior to or during the interrogation
process. Because the rights to counsel and to silence are
fully equivalent under the Constitution, the same standard
should be applicable no matter which of the rights has been
invoked. For this reason, there seems little doubt after
Dryden that once a Wyoming defendant has expressed a desire to remain silent, interrogation must cease unless and
until he, himself initiates further conversation.
D. VoluntarinessDeteriminationsStill PotentiallyNecessary
Under the Dryden Rule.
Under the Dryden decision, and under its suggested extension, the state is precluded from making a showing of
waiver where the defendant has invoked his Miranda rights
and has not himself reopened conversation with the authorities. Even where the state can prove that these prerequisites
have been met, however, it may still face a challenge to the
validity of the delayed waiver. The question to be resolved
53. Id. at 490, 491. The court cited Miskimins v. State, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411
(1899), and Maki v. State, 18 Wyo. 481, 112 P. 334 (1911), for the proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to advice
of counsel are firmly established in Wyoming.
54. Id. at 491.
55.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 475. (emphasis added).
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under this circumstance concerns the possibility that the defendant who has changed his mind may have done so through
a misunderstanding of his constitutional rights. In Commonwealth v. Youngblood,56 for example, the court held inadmissible a confession volunteered after invocation of rights,
stating that when a defendant has assumed "conradictory
positions with respect to his submission to interrogation,"
the investigating officers must inquire further in order to
ascertain that his change of position was the product of
"intelligence and understanding" rather than of "ignorance
and confusion." 5 ' A similar question as to the suspect's lack
of understanding was otherwise resolved by the D.C. Circuit, 8 over a strong dissent by Chief Judge Bazelon. In that
case, a defendant who had specifically waived his right to
counsel and thereafter indicated a desire to confess refused
to allow the officers to commit his statement to writing. Although the majority held his statement admissible, Judge
Bazelon read Miranda as requiring that where "the suspect
says or does something sufficient to put a reasonable man
on notice that the warnings may not have been understood,""
interrogation must cease until the matter has been clarified.
Even though the suspect-initiated statement may present the
courts with a voluntariness dilemma, it is clear that the per se
rule has significantly narrowed the area in which a voluntariness-in-fact determination will be required.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As the previous discussion has noted, judicial struggle
toward the formulation of fair and comprehensible admissibility standards did not culminate with Miranda. The conflicting interpretations to which Miranda has been subject
reflect a certain ambiguity in the case itself. Thus, while
some courts stress Miranda's concern that confessions must
be voluntary, others emphasize the prophylactic effect of its
exclusionary rule. Admittedly these are related, for insofar
as the rule deters police behavior which in fact induces in56. 307 A.2d 922 (Pa. 1973).
57. Id. at 927.

58. United States v. Frazier, mspra note 9.
59. Id. at 901 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
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voluntary statements, its voluntariness and deterrence functions coincide, voluntariness and deterrence are separable
concepts, however, with significantly different consequences.
It is the deterrence aspect of Miranda that Wyoming has
chosen to emphasize.
As explications of the basic constitutional right that
"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself,"" ° Dryden's exclusionary rules
have their source in the Constitution. Were the prevention
of compelled admissions the sole concern, however, police
methods would be of only evidentiary value, and inquiry
would be directed toward police misbehavior not as an abstract proposition, but only as it affects the suspect's "governing self-direction." 1
Dryden's exclusionary rules are rules of law which conclusively presume the involuntariness of statements obtained
in the context of particular police misbehavior. Because they
are based upon the constitutional protection against compelled testimony, the rules exceed their constitutional grounding to the extent that they prevent the admission of statements which were voluntary even in the face of improper
police procedure. The rules may be justified, however, in a
frank recognition that the impossibility of judging "after
the fact ... the precise subjective state of mind of every defendant whose confession was challenged as involuntary" 2
has long confounded a rational application of the voluntariness standard. Expressive of notions of the "respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens," 3 the Dryden decision has sensibly
incorporated into easily applicable exclusionary rules factors
likely to lead to involuntary admission.
MOLLY MARTIN

60.
61.
62.
63.

U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

Culombe v. Connecticut, supra note 5, at 602.
United States v. Frazier, supra note 9, at 901 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 460.
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